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Miloš Marković
The Inextricable Entanglement of 
Argumentation and Interpretation in Law
Abstract At the basis of tireless efforts to explain the nature of law lies the 
question of how judges should decide cases. Therefrom arises a need for a theory 
that would clarify the role of the courts and, moreover, provide guidance to them 
on reaching judgments. The history of legal theory abounds with various attempts 
to offer a generally acceptable answer to the question raised. The fervor of debate 
and the perpetual dissatisfaction with offered solutions prompted the thought 
of untamable arbitrariness of judges. In the contemporary debate the significance 
of argumentation is particularly emphasized as a link of the court procedure 
which provides reasonableness and therewith justification and persuasiveness 
of the decision.
Before going into the matter, I will indicate in broad strokes which areas of legal 
theory do argumentation and interpretation belong to. The purpose of setting a 
conceptual framework is to prevent losing sight of the whole as well as to limit 
the scope of discourse to a certain section of legal issues. The second part deals 
with the concept of argumentation in general and some specific features of the 
argumentation in law. The third part examines the role of legal interpretation 
and draws a clear distinction between the interpretation as a process and the 
interpretation as a result. At the end of the discussion I shall put forward a thesis 
that the interpretation as a process is argumentation, while the interpretation 
as a result is an argument in the justification of judgment.
Keywords: Law, Argumentation, Interpretation, Interpretive argumentation, 
Interpretive conclusion
1. A Conceptual Framework of Law
A thoughtful explanation of the interpretation´s and argumentation´s role 
in law necessitates an adumbration of the fundamental problems in legal 
philosophy.1  To set a conceptual framework, although an unavoidably im-
precise one, is of exceptional importance because it contributes to a better 
understanding of the more concrete issues due to their interconnectedness. 
This is supported by the fact that every formulation of fundamental issues 
1  “The reflection about law, its ways of functioning, about lawyers, their thinking 
methods and their scientific apparatus, leads to fundamental, essential questions. Every 
lawyer should have them recognized and plausibly answered, if he wants to work sensi-
bly and responsibly in his professional field.” (Rüthers et al. 2015: 16)
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raises a claim to completeness in the sense that an insight into every aspect 
of the law is gained by providing an answer to them.
The arising difficulty consists in the disagreement among legal philosophers 
as to which issues are considered fundamental. Comparing different views 
would certainly provide a more complete insight into the set of core legal 
topics. However, the slender similarities considering formulations of rele-
vant issues, the ever more precise subdivisions of concrete problems and 
their mutual interdependence make every attempt to draw parallels between 
the various conceptual frameworks almost impossible in a work of limited 
extent. In the light of such a vast diversity a focus is needed on a particular 
representative approach. In this paper the reference point shall be an instance 
of a three-dimensional approach.2
In the course of centuries legal philosophy has produced three fundamental 
questions about law (Rüthers et al. 2015: 3). At the very beginning of endless 
discussions, the fascination for this seemingly unfathomable social phenome-
non was given expression in question about the essence or the nature of law: 
What is law? The relentless controversy between legal positivists and legal 
non-positivists over the relationship between law and morality has led to the 
limitation of the first question to the criteria of the validity of law and the 
separation of the second question about the normativity of law: Why does 
law (not) obligate? The gap between the principle of legal certainty and the 
inherent indeterminacy of language, in which all law is expressed, led to the 
division into formalist and skeptical viewpoints and brought the method-
ological problem to the fore: How to apply law correctly?3 While the first 
2  In opposition to the three-dimensional framework, some authors make difference 
only between two fundamental questions: “What is law?” and “What is the law in a  concrete 
case?” The first question concerns the essence or the nature of law, while the second 
question refers to the application of law. In such a two-dimensional framework the whole 
legal theory is divided in an abstract and a concrete level. The question about the nature 
of law further decomposes into the question about validity of law and the question about 
normativity of law. Therefrom arises an assumption that in the two-dimensional frame-
work the question about legal normativity has a conceptual character, which means that 
all legal norms are either always obligatory or never obligatory. In contrast, in the 
three-dimensional framework a legal norm can, but must not possess normative strength. 
In other words, the question about normativity of law has to be solved in each case sep-
arately. See: Marmor, Sarch, internet.
3  In a two-dimensional framework at the concrete level some authors make difference 
between two questions. First, “What is the law in a concrete case?” that is “What does the 
law say in a concrete case?” Second, “How should a judge solve a case?” that is “What 
should the judgment say in a concrete case?” Kelsen, Hart and Raz consider those two 
questions as different, which means that their explanations of law and their explanations 
of adjudications are not one and the same. That means that non-legal reasons may play 
a role in reaching a judicial decision. Judges must have discretion in order to interpret 
unclear legal provisions, to correct legally valid, but particularly immoral norms or to fill 
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two issues are of a particularly theoretical nature, the third issue belongs to 
more practical spheres of jurisprudence.
Numerous authors seek to focus their research of law on a particular field 
and thus make the greatest possible contribution to legal philosophy due 
to the precision of methods, though at the cost of the generality of subject 
matter. In contrast to such a diversification, there is an understanding that 
in principle three fundamental issues cannot be solved separately. With ex-
traordinary skillfulness Dworkin strives to interweave each of the three fun-
damental questions in the network of his comprehensive theory.4 Starting 
from the thesis that judges do not enjoy discretion and thus can never over-
step the bounds of law, it was necessary to extend the narrow conception 
of law beyond the enacted regulations and to bring the answer to question 
about the nature of law into accordance with the assumptions about its ap-
plication. For this reason, Dworkin introduced legal principles in addition 
to legal rules and defined them as “requirement(s) of justice or fairness or 
some other dimension of morality” whose origin as “legal principles lies not 
in a particular decision of some legislature or court, but in a sense of appro-
priateness developed in the profession and the public over time” (Dworkin 
1977: 22, 40).  The presence of a moral element in the solution of the re-
maining two fundamental problems inevitably led to providing at least par-
tial answer to the question of the normative power of law.
Dworkin’s stance teaches us that the dividing lines in law should not be 
drawn too sharply. Answering any of the fundamental questions has inev-
itable consequences for the conception and solution of the remaining two 
issues. This is, among other things, shown by the fact that for a long time all 
the inquiry about law boiled down to just one all-encompassing question: 
What is law? However, the distinction between the fundamental issues em-
phasizes various aspects and provides an insight into the complexity of legal 
phenomenon. The peculiarities of a legal theory arise precisely from the fact 
which question is given priority and therefore answered first of all.
gaps where the law is undesignated. On the contrary, Dworkin treats the two questions 
as equal. Accordingly, the problems of ambiguity, immorality or incompleteness of law 
do not emerge, so that the judges do not resort to non-legal reasons in making their 
decision. All the reasons for the judgment represent necessarily a part of law. See: Dick-
son, internet.
4  Although Dworkin accepts to a certain extent the differentiation between the ques-
tion about the essence of law and the question about the obligatoriness of law, in the sense 
that the legal philosophy investigates the “grounds of law” (criteria of legal validity), while 
the political philosophy is interested in the “force of law” (obligatory character of law), 
he explicitly claims that an exclusive debate about one problem is only possible at the 
high level of abstraction and on the basis of a sufficient agreement about the other prob-
lem. Dworkin 1986: 108–113.
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Since the three fundamental problems have struck strong roots in contempo-
rary theory of law, it is advisable to abide by the set conceptual framework. 
Legal argumentation and interpretation belong to a more practical sphere 
of jurisprudence.5 Therefore, the discourse on relationship between legal 
interpretation and argumentation falls into the third section of legal issues.
2. Law and Argumentation
Lawyers argue. Judges are moreover under the obligation to legally justify 
their decisions. Attorneys as representatives in criminal or civil matters try 
to convince the judge of the valid legal grounds for the raised claims respec-
tively. The course of the court proceedings evidently shows that the func-
tion of lawyers has an argumentative character. At the same time, the argu-
ments put forward before the court have specific features that make them 
legal arguments. In order to explain legal argumentation, it is necessary to 
become acquainted with the concept of argumentation in general, and then 
to establish the connection between law and argumentation.
2.1. The Concept of Argumentation
Legal argumentation is a type of argumentation. The basic question expect-
ed to be answered when explaining the argumentative nature of the legal 
practice concerns the concept of argumentation. At first glance, it is sur-
prising that in many works devoted to the problem of argumentation in 
law it is rare to find an explicit definition of argumentation in general. One 
of the exceptions is the simple definition given by MacCormick in his arti-
cle Argumentation and Interpretation in Law: “Argumentation is the activity 
of presenting arguments for or against something.” (MacCormick 1993: 16) 
A definition in that manner can be considered in the light of Agrippa’s tri-
lemma: 1) If the concept of argument were to be explained by reference to 
argumentation, a circular definition error would be committed; 2) The defi-
nition of argument as a reason for or against something would leave unre-
solved the pressing question about the essence of reason; 3) The assumption 
that the concept of argument is self-explanatory also leaves room for doubt. 
The offered definition can be justified by MacCormick’s primary intention 
to distinguish between theoretical and practical argumentation, as well as 
to attribute practical character to the legal argumentation. Be that as it may, 
in his article MacCormick did not take on the task to construct a compre-
hensive definition of argumentation that would serve as a basis for the ex-
planation of its role in law.
5  “Legal interpretation is a means for the realization of the practical task of jurispru-
dence. It ultimately consists in that to say what is legally required, prohibited and per-
mitted in concrete cases.” (Alexy 1995: 79)
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Considering that legal theorists avoid an explicit and concise definition of 
both legal argumentation and argumentation in general, the question arises 
as to whether the argumentation can be defined and whether there is a need 
for a definition. One of the important lessons for jurisprudence was Hart’s 
attitude towards the problem of definition in law (Hart 1994: 13–17). The 
classic form of definition per genus proximum and differentiam specificam is 
distinguished by its simplicity. In addition, it offers a set of words that can 
always replace the relevant term. The elegance of such a definition is flawed 
by the fact that it is often impossible to meet its conditions.6 According to 
Hart the problems involved are sometimes too different from one another 
and too fundamental to be resolved by means of a definition. The absence 
of a definition clearly indicates that such an attitude prevails among legal 
theorists with respect to the concept of argumentation.
In contrast, a glimpse on the situation in the theory of argumentation pro-
vides an insight into a generally affirmative attitude towards the definition 
of basic concepts.7 Under the strong influence of classical and post-classical 
rhetoric and dialectics, different approaches are established which offer a 
vast array of arguments (Van Eemeren 2001: 12–17). The main problem con-
sists in the fact that each of those approaches starts from a different point. 
In order to properly understand any offered definition of a fundamental 
problem such as argumentation, it is necessary to gain insight into the basic 
assumptions of the relevant approach.
Bearing in mind the difficulties that arise in the analysis of the fundamen-
tal legal concepts and drawing on the contribution made by the theory of 
argumentation, I consider that a provisional definition of argumentation 
with a necessary explanation of some additional aspects would be instruc-
tive.8 Argumentation can be defined as a process of convincing that a par-
ticular standpoint is correct by giving reasons.9 A difference can be drawn 
6  According to Hart there are three main obstacles to this type of definition: 1) the 
generic concept may be unclear; 2) all words have a penumbra of uncertainty; 3) the 
meaning of word depends on the context. See: Hart 1994: 13–17.
7  “A definition of argumentation suitable to be used in argumentation theory as an 
academic discipline should, in our view, connect with commonly recognized characteris-
tics of argumentation as it is known from everyday practice.” (Van Eemeren et al. 2014: 3)
8  Alexy appeals to the same kind of reason in order to justify his definition of philoso-
phy. It should only serve as “a starting point for an answer to the question about the nature 
of legal philosophy. (W)e need, indeed, an understanding of the general nature of philos-
ophy only as a first step and not as a final and complete basis on which our understanding 
of the nature of legal philosophy rests, like a house on its foundations.” (Alexy 2004: 157)
9  For the sake of comparison a definition from the argumentation theory follows: 
„Argumentation is a verbal, social, and rational activity aimed at convincing a reasonable 
critic of the acceptability of a certain opinion by advancing one or more propositions 
designed to justify that standpoint.” (Van Eemeren, Henkemans 2017: 1)
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between the pro and contra arguments depending on whether the reasons 
affirm or deny the relevant standpoint. From the concept of argumentation 
follows its interactive, communicative and rational character. In order for 
a particular position to be considered correct, it must be reasoned (argued).
Argumentation has an interactive character. It is part of a dialogue, not a 
monologue. Arguments are presented when one is supposed to convince the 
other of the correctness of a particular point of view. Interactivity consists 
in the intended change of attitudes of the addressee. Opinions on an issue 
must be originally divided in order to start arguing at all. The argumentator 
adopts a certain standpoint in advance and seeks to show the other party 
that it is correct by giving reasons. The listener or reader either advocates 
the opposite view or has not yet taken a stance on the relevant issue.10 Argu-
mentation can be symmetrical or asymmetrical depending on whether both 
sides advance and advocate opposite views, or the audience has yet to gain 
insight into and take a stand on a problem (Rescher 2007: 26).
Argumentation has a communicative character. As a rule, the arguments are 
formulated in words. Nonetheless, the reasons may be expressed by using 
a variety of symbols. 11 Anything that can be a bearer of meaning can be a 
bearer of argument. Still, having in mind that the other symbols can always 
be reformulated into the signs of language, and given that language is a reg-
ular means of communication, it is plausible to say that argumentation has 
a verbal character.12 After all, the use of language is often implicit in the re-
construction of the argumentative procedure.
Argumentation has a rational character. Giving arguments means referring 
to rationality. The argumentator always starts from the implicit assump-
tion that the listener or reader will act as a rational critic when judging 
whether the reasons offered are valid or invalid.13 The necessary premise of 
10  If the convincement about the correctness of a certain standpoint could be graduat-
ed, then arguments could be used not only to create a new or qualitatively change the 
present opinion of another party, but also to quantitatively weaken or strengthen the 
convincement about the correctness of an already accepted standpoint. In that case the 
argumentation could also take place between the subjects who share the standpoint about 
certain question. Nonetheless, the regular assumption underlying argumentation is a 
discrepancy between the standpoints or an absence of standpoint on the side of the audience.
11  “Although these communicative moves are usually verbal, they can also be wholly 
or partly nonverbal, e.g., visual.”  (Van Eemeren et al. 2014: 5)
12  “Argumentation is a verbal activity that can be performed orally and in writing.“ 
Van Eemeren, Henkemans, 2017: 1.
13  “(Argumentation) is aimed at convincing the addressee of the acceptability of the 
standpoint by making them see that mutually shared critical standards of reasonableness 
have been met. Trying to convince the addressee by means of argumentation relies on 
the idea that the other party will approach the argumentation constructively, judging its 
soundness reasonably.” (Van Eemeren et al. 2014: 6)
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 argumentative activity states that the subjects of argumentation, that is, hu-
man beings as such, are, in principle, capable of distinguishing good from 
bad reasons for accepting substantial statements (Alexy 1995: 120). The task 
of the argumentation theory is to determine which criteria should be met for 
the argumentation to be labeled reasonable. Different argumentative areas 
contain different criteria of rationality (Alexy 2000: 7).
2.2. Legal argumentation
One of the main causes for the growing interest in legal argumentation is a 
change in the understanding of the roles allotted to legislator and judge (Fe-
teris 1999: 5). In the 19th century the prevailing opinion on the role of lawyers 
rested on Montesquieu’s doctrine of the separation of powers. The legislative 
function consisted in the formulation of clear and precise laws, while courts 
were meant to apply rules literally in concrete cases. In the 20th century, as 
the opinion prevailed that it is impossible to conceive all future cases or reli-
ably foresee changes in social relations and moral attitudes, the theory of the 
strict separation of legislative and judicial powers was abandoned. The leg-
islator´s task was narrowed to the formulation of a general norm, the mean-
ing of which in difficult cases judges have to choose and justify their choice.
Legal argumentation can be analyzed from a normative and a descriptive 
perspective (Feteris 1999: 14). A normative theory seeks to determine the 
criteria of rationality, that is, the criteria of correctness of legal argumenta-
tion. The task of a descriptive theory consists in an analysis of argumenta-
tive techniques that are effective in persuading a particular legal audience.
Over the last 40 years three more or less consistent normative approaches to 
legal argumentation have evolved (Feteris, Kloosterhuis 2009: 312–318). The 
longest tradition in the study of legal argumentation has the logical approach. 
From the logical perspective the formal validity is emphasized as a criterion of 
the rationality of legal argumentation. The logical consistence of argumenta-
tion is a necessary, though not a sufficient condition, since it is required that 
the arguments put forward comply with the legal norms. On the contrary, by 
denying almost any importance to the form of argumentation, the rhetorical 
approach brings the content of the arguments to the fore. From a substantial 
perspective, the rationality of argumentation depends on the effectiveness, 
i.e. persuasiveness of arguments. In the rhetorical approach a paramount im-
portance is attributed to the context, as it determines the success of an argu-
ment. In response to the one-sidedness of previous approaches, a discursive 
approach was founded on the basis of logical, rhetorical and communicative 
aspects of argumentation. Argumentation has a rational character when it 
is conducted in accordance with certain procedural criteria. Discursive ap-
proach prevails in contemporary theory of law (Alexy 1995: 95).
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The argumentation process takes place in different legal contexts. These in-
clude discussions of legal theorists, legal counseling, peaceful resolution of 
a dispute, proceedings before the court, debates in the parliament, assess-
ment of issued judgments in the media. The types of legal argumentation 
differ in terms of whether they are institutionalized, whether they are lim-
ited to a certain period of time, whether a binding decision is made at the 
end (Alexy 1991: 262). The least confined type represents a legal theoretical 
discussion, while the most restrictions are present in the court proceedings. 
What is common to all different types of legal argumentation and what dis-
tinguishes them from moral argumentation is their attachment to valid law 
(Alexy 1991: 262). Therefore, legal argumentation can be defined as a pro-
cess of convincing that a legal standpoint is correct by giving (legal) reasons.14
The court proceeding undoubtedly constitutes a paradigm when explain-
ing the relationship between law and argumentation.15 The subject of court 
proceeding is a dispute. The reason for bringing forward arguments before 
the court is the need to eliminate the dispute by a third unbiased and disin-
terested party decision. Thus, a conflict of interest is the reason to reach for 
arguments in a legal context.
Arguments, however, are not the only means available to help resolve a dis-
pute. There are different ways to make the other party give up its interest. 
Fraud, as well as any form of coercion, such as threat or force, are the very 
opposite of argumentation. Fraud consists in giving deliberately false argu-
ments, that is to say, in adducing nonexistent reasons in order to convince 
the other party to believe the correctness of a standpoint. Coercion, on the 
other side, is not at all concerned with the correctness of a standpoint. The 
appeal to force represents a logical error in the wider sense, “because no log-
ical justification of expressed opinion is offered, although it can be a rhe-
torically effective means of persuading the audience” (Van Eemeren 2001: 
146–147). Fraud involves untrue, and coercion unsound arguments, which 
is why they fall into the category of prohibited argumentative moves.16
Furthermore, conflicts of interest do not have to be solved by legal  arguments. 
One side in the dispute can try to convince the other one of the correctness 
14  „Everybody who advances a legal standpoint and wishes this standpoint to be ac-
cepted by others, will have to present justifying arguments.“ (Feteris 1999: 1)
15  „When other participants – say, legal scholars, attorneys, or interested citizens – 
adduce arguments for or against certain contents of the legal system, they refer in the end 
to how a judge would have to decide if he wanted to decide correctly.” (Alexy 2002: 25)
16  Although coercion is normally considered to be an irrational means to solve a 
conflict, the way law functions gives cause to ask about exceptions. If the affected party 
does not accept the judgment, the state threatens with the application of force and ulti-
mately implements the decision by force. A doubt in the rationality of the state power 
calls into question the justifiability of the monopoly on violence.
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of a standpoint by giving moral reasons, and vice versa. If any of the par-
ties is successful in that endeavor, the dispute between them ceases to exist. 
However, as soon as any of the parties invokes the law, the argumentation 
takes on a legal character. The legal claims raised suggest the proximity of 
the state´s coercive apparatus, which is going to enforce the court decision 
independently of the will of the affected parties. Argumentation that takes 
place before invoking the law can be designated as non-legal, while after-
wards it becomes a legal argumentation.
A dispute is solved when one party completely abandons its interest or when 
both parties partially climb down. In the first case, one party is triumphant 
over the other, while in the other case, both sides reach a compromise. When 
a dispute is to be solved by argumentation, each party tries to persuade the 
opposite party to believe the correctness of a standpoint, wherefore it gives 
reasons for its own, and against the opposite standpoint.
Court proceedings represent the main setting in which legal argumentation 
takes place. However, this is not the only possible way to eliminate the con-
flict of interest by legal means. Parties may put forward legal arguments and 
try to resolve their dispute among themselves with or without the help of 
attorneys. If no party succeeds in convincing the other one of the correct-
ness of its standpoint, then there is nothing left but to initiate a court pro-
ceeding. The first type of argumentation could be designated as extrajudi-
cial and the second one as judicial. Out of court each party seeks to persuade 
the other one, whose interest is also at stake in the dispute, while before the 
court both parties seek to convince the judge, who plays the role of a disin-
terested decision maker.
It is instructive to draw a distinction between a passive and an active model 
of judicial argumentation. According to the active model, after hearing the 
arguments parties put forward referring to the legal grounds of their claims, 
it is up to the court to assess whose argumentation is more convincing. The 
judge´s task exhausts itself in the choice between the alternative justifica-
tions offered. By contrast, according to the active model, the court is sup-
posed to form its own opinion on the legal ground of the conflicting claims. 
Although parties to a dispute may suggest which arguments are relevant 
in their particular case, the judge is not bound by their proffered opinions. 
Which model of judicial argumentation shall be accepted is a matter of le-
gal policy. The active model seems to be better suited for the protection of 
public interest, while the passive model would be more appropriate in pri-
vate law cases. Indeed, court proceedings can be molded by combining both 
models depending on the type of issue at stake.
The purpose of legal argumentation is to justify a legal judgment as an indi-
vidual case of normative proposition (Alexy 1991: 273). The court pronounces 
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its judgment and informs parties of the reasons for its judgment in order for 
them to accept the correctness of the court’s decision. The judgment ratio-
nale enables higher-instance judges to verify whether the judgment rendered 
is correct and lower-instance judges to ensure the uniformity of law. In addi-
tion, a justification is subject to public appraisal: the judgment rationale forms 
the basis for evaluation of the judgment in legal discussions and law journals.
The structure of argumentation in law is, unlike its purpose, a subject of nu-
merous disputes. According to a widely accepted understanding a difference 
exists between an internal and an external justification of judgment. A court’s 
decision is internally justified if it logically follows from a legally valid norm 
and a statement of facts (Alexy 1991: 18). Premises of legal syllogism repre-
sent direct arguments in support of the judgment. The internal justification 
is contextually sufficient, because it is limited to material that was originally 
accepted as legal (Aarnio 1990: 75). The external justification consists in the 
justification of the premises. Arguments in favor of or against the premises 
used in legal syllogism are indirect arguments in relation to the judgment. 
In view of the normative and the descriptive premise in legal syllogism, ex-
ternal justification involves two types of argumentation: interpretive argu-
mentation and evidentiary argumentation.
2.3. Legal Argumentation and Interpretation
The basic characteristic of legal argumentation is its attachment to valid law. 
This means that the reasons which can be given in favor of or against a judg-
ment are not unlimited. Therefore MacCormick draws a distinction between 
substantive arguments as reasons carrying practical weight independently 
of authority and authoritative arguments as reasons referring to the author-
ity of lawmaker (MacCormick 1993: 17–18). Despite a somewhat different 
terminology, Alexy introduces an identical distinction between institution-
al arguments which are possible solely within the institutional framework 
of a legal system and general practical arguments which draw their pow-
er exclusively from their own substantial correctness (Alexy 1995: 87–89).
Opinions of legal theorists as to the exclusiveness of authoritative (insti-
tutional) arguments are divided (MacCormick 1993: 18). The strong the-
sis claims that authoritative arguments constitute the only acceptable argu-
ments in law. The court cannot invoke norms of morality in the judgment 
rationale. On the contrary, the weak thesis requires the use of authoritative, 
while allowing the complementary use of substantive arguments. This means 
that authoritative arguments do not have an essential, but only a necessary 
character in the field of law. The answer to the question about the correct-
ness of the depicted theses depends on whether it proceeds from a positivist 
or a non-positivist concept of law. Thus, both strong and weak thesis must 
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be addressed in the light of the dilemma of legal non-positivism. 17 Alexy 
and MacCormick expressly accept the weak thesis as the correct one (Alexy 
1995: 88; MacCormick 1993: 18).
Irrespective of the question as to their exclusiveness, authoritative arguments 
are inevitable in law. A reference to the authority of lawmaker implies a ref-
erence to a particular legal text. This is explained by the fact that all laws are 
expressed in language. This does not mean that every legal norm is neces-
sarily enacted, but that each can be formulated as a particular legal propo-
sition. There is no law beyond language.18 According to Hart, the legislation 
and the precedent represent two basic means to communicate general stan-
dards of conduct. The first of them makes use of words as much as possible, 
while the other requires minimal use of language.
In order to apply the law to a particular case, the established facts must be 
subsumed under an appropriate legal norm. The main problem of legal syl-
logism is the gap that regularly yawns between the words of the legal norm 
and the words of the statement of facts.19 Starting only from the dissonant-
ly formulated normative and descriptive premise it is impossible to draw a 
logically correct conclusion about the applicability of the relevant norm to 
the given case, and thus to internally justify the judgment. Language gap can 
be overcome by reformulating the legal norm so that it corresponds to the 
description of the factual situation. The reformulation of the norm must re-
main true to its original meaning. In fact, it represents the determination of 
the norm´s meaning with respect to the facts of the case.
The role of interpretation in law is an inevitable consequence of the signifi-
cance attributed to authoritative reasons in rendering judgments (MacCor-
mick 1993: 19). Justification of a judgment necessitates authoritative argu-
ments. Authoritative arguments involve a reference to certain legal texts. 
Therefore, in order to justify a judgment, it is necessary to determine the 
meaning of a legal norm expressed in language. It follows that interpretation, 
as a process in which the meaning of a statute´s text or a judicial precedent is 
being determined, is an inevitable part in the process of justifying a judgment.
The consideration of authoritative arguments throws light on the inextri-
cable link between interpretation and law. Interpretation is a necessary el-
ement of argumentation when justifying a judgment. The question as to 
the role of argumentation in determining the meaning of legal regulations 
17  About the dilemma of the legal non-positivism see: Alexy 2000: 15–16.
18  “Even those who conceive a law as preceding the language – in the sense of “legal 
perception” or “legal awareness” – have to reach for the language in order to express the 
conceived or experienced contents and enable their effectiveness.” (Rüthers et al. 2015: 101)
19  The problem of how to state facts and formulate the descriptive premise is here left 
aside.
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remains, however, unanswered. Does the legal interpreter have to engage in 
argumentation just as the legal argumentator has to resort to interpretation?
3. Legal Interpretation
Legal interpretation is a type of interpretation. Since the term “interpreta-
tion” is ambiguous, it is advisable to learn about its possible meanings so 
as to establish order in the analysis of the role interpretation plays in law.
With regard to the subject, a distinction can be drawn between a general 
and a language interpretation (Alexy 1995: 71–73). The general interpreta-
tion is interpretation of any symbol, a sign made with intention to convey a 
meaning. The language interpretation is interpretation of linguistic symbols. 
With regard to the doubt, a difference can be made between interpretation 
in a broad and a narrow sense (MacCormick 2005: 121).  Interpretation in 
the broad sense encompasses every case of understanding a symbol. Inter-
pretation in the narrow sense includes the presence of a doubt about the 
correctness of understanding a symbol and its resolution through a choice 
based on reasons. Interpretation in the narrow sense corresponds to what is 
usually called construction (Alexy 1995: 73). At the heart of numerous legal 
discussions lies the problem of language interpretation in the narrow sense.
However, the term “interpretation” contains yet another ambiguity. The third 
ambiguity matches the linguistically plain difference between judging and the 
judgment. Judging is an activity, while the judgment represents the outcome 
of that activity. Analogously, the term “interpretation” could refer either to 
the interpretive process or the result of that process. In order to resolve such 
equivocation, it is prudent to draw a distinction between interpretive argu-
mentation as a process and interpretive conclusion as its outcome.
Interpretive conclusion as an outcome of interpreting represents an inter-
pretive assertion (opinion, standpoint). As an assertion it necessarily raises 
a claim to correctness (Alexy 1995: 77). In order to demonstrate the correct-
ness of an interpretive conclusion, it is necessary to offer reasons for and 
refute reasons against it. It follows that interpretation as a process actually 
represents argumentation.20
The introduced distinction sheds light on the fact that not only the interpre-
tation as a result is important for argumentation (in rendering a judgment), 
but also argumentation is important for the interpretation as a process (in 
20  In a similar way a line can be drawn between judging and a judgment. Judging is an 
activity, while a judgment represents the outcome of that activity. A judgment is an as-
sertion which necessarily raises a claim to correctness. In order to demonstrate the 
correctness of the judgment, the judge has to bring forward arguments for and refute 
arguments against it. Therefore, judging is an argumentative activity.
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choosing a meaning) (Compare: MacCormick, 1993: 20). It is important to 
note that interpretation and argumentation in law are linked by the authority. 
Starting from the weak thesis, the significance of interpretive conclusion as 
an argument in favor of the judgment can be expressed in the following way:
 1)  In order to legally justify its judgment, the court must use at least 
 authoritative arguments.
 2)  In order to use authoritative arguments, the court must interpret 
regulations.
 3)  In order to legally justify its judgment, the court must interpret reg-
ulations.
The significance of arguments in choosing a meaning of legal regulations 
can be expressed as follows:
 4) In order to interpret regulations, the court must justify the choice of 
a particular meaning.
 5) In order to justify the choice of a particular meaning, the court must 
use arguments.
 6) In order to interpret regulations, the court must use arguments.
From the explanation of the structure of legal argumentation, it follows that 
the judgment is the outcome of direct argumentation, while the interpretive 
conclusion is the outcome of indirect argumentation. An interpretive con-
clusion is, in fact, the major premise of legal syllogism, which must be justi-
fied by indirect arguments in support of the judgment.
Methods of interpretation are arguments. Interpretive arguments can be 
classified in different ways. The first known systematic debate on legal in-
terpretation in England dates back to 1567 (Frankfurter 1963: 60). Canons 
of interpretations were and remain the subject of numerous discussions in 
German theory of law from Savigny’s work in 1840 (Rüthers et al. 2015: 423–
427). Countless elaborated theories require us to focus our attention on con-
temporary authors. MacCormick distinguishes linguistic, systemic and te-
leological arguments.21  Alexy introduces a distinction between institutional 
arguments, which include linguistic, genetic, and systemic, and general prac-
tical arguments, which include deontological and teleological arguments.22
21  At the outset MacCormick included both teleological and deontological arguments in 
the interpretive arguments. However, later he retained only the teleological argumentation in 
law as an expression of the consequentialism. MacCormick 1993: 25; MacCormick 2005: 132.
22 Alexy initially discriminated between semantic, genetic, historical, comparative, system-
ic and teleological interpretive arguments in law. Subsequently he will subsume the historical 
and comparative argument under the systemic one, and moreover introduce the distinction 
between institutional and general practical arguments. Alexy 1991: 289; Alexy 1995: 85–89.
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4. Conclusion
Legal interpretation as a process represents an argumentation in which rea-
sons are given in favor of or against a certain understanding of the relevant 
legal norm. In relation to the judgment interpretive arguments are indirect, 
because they justify the choice of the major premise in legal syllogism. It fol-
lows that interpretation as a process is argumentation.
Since law is expressed in language and a legal judgment requires authoritative 
arguments, the legal interpretation as a result is used in the justification of 
judgment. An interpretive conclusion represents a direct argument in favor 
of the judgment. In fact, it constitutes the major premise of legal syllogism. 
It follows that interpretation as a result is an argument.
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Miloš Marković
nerazmrsivi splet argumentacije i interpretacije u pravu
Apstrakt
U temelju neumornih poduhvata da se objasni priroda prava počiva pitanje kako 
sudije treba da rešavaju slučajeve. Otuda proističe potreba za teorijom koja bi 
rasvetlila ulogu sudova i štaviše pružila im smernice prilikom donošenja presuda. 
Istorija pravne teorije obiluje raznovrsnim pokušajima da se na postavljeno  pitanje 
ponudi opšteprihvatljiv odgovor. Vatrenost rasprave i stalnu nezadovoljnost po-
nuđenim rešenjima podsticala je misao o neukrotivoj proizvoljnosti sudija. U sa-
vremenoj debati se naročito ističe značaj argumentacije kao karike sudskog po-
stupka koja obezbeđuje razumnost i time opravdanost i ubedljivost donete 
odluke.
Pre ulaska u meritum stvari naznačiću u opštim crtama kojoj oblasti teorije pra-
va pripadaju argumentacija i interpretacija. Smisao postavljanja misaonog okvira 
jeste da se predupredi gubljenje iz vida celine, a da se istovremeno ograniče do-
meti izlaganja na određeni deo pravne problematike. Drugi deo rada je posvećen 
pojmu argumentacije uopšte i specifičnostima argumentacije u pravu. U trećem 
delu se razmatra uloga pravne interpretacije i povlači jasna razlika između inter-
pretacije kao procesa i interpretacije kao rezultata. U zaključku rasprave izneću 
tezu da je interpretacija kao proces argumentacija, dok je interpretacija kao re-
zultat argument prilikom obrazlaganja presude.
Ključne reči: Pravo, argumentacija, interpretacija, interpretativna argumentacija, 
interpretativni zaključak
